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Abstract 
 
This study takes a retrospective look at the time course of total fertility rate (TFR) and the 
main factors purported to influence fertility rate, per capita wealth, female education and 
population-focused voluntary family planning programs. It was found that countries that 
implemented strong family planning programs achieved fertility reduction much faster and 
earlier than comparable countries that did not. Fertility decline typically preceded marked 
increases in wealth, but per capita wealth growth usually accelerated when fertility fell to 
between two and three births per woman. Thus the negative relationship between TFR and 
GDP per capita tends to be deeply concave for those countries that have achieved relatively 
low fertility. Higher fertility countries in the same region tend to follow a parallel course, but 
at a slower pace, and most with current fertility above three are yet to see sustained wealth 
increase. Girls’ educational attainment was found to be neither a pre-requisite nor a sufficient 
measure to drive fertility decline. In the absence of significant income from oil or other 
resources, fertility reduction appears to be a necessary if not sufficient condition for sustained 
economic growth. Causation runs in both directions, with a virtuous cycle of prosperity and 
development of education and health services enhancing the reduction in family size, but 
interventions to promote prosperity are less cost-effective in priming this cycle than 
interventions for fertility reduction. The data do not support the claim that “development is 
the best contraception.” On the contrary, they present a strong case that “contraception is the 
best development stimulus.” 
 
Introduction 
 
The demographic transition, from high mortality and high fertility to low mortality and low 
fertility, is the hallmark societal change of the modern era. Globally, the achievement of 
mortality reduction has preceded that of fertility reduction, which remains far less uniform 
among countries. As long as fertility exceeds mortality, population grows, placing strain on 
natural resources and on economic capacity to provide for additional people. Yet, it is 
assumed that all nations will eventually complete the transition, and that high population 
growth rate is therefore only a transitory issue.  
 
The belief that fertility decline and population stabilisation will occur as a natural 
consequence of socioeconomic modernisation has been referred to as demographic transition 
theory (Kirk, 1996). The theory contends that lower desired family size will follow from such 
factors as greater income, education, urbanisation and infant survival.  
 
The negative correlation globally between per capita wealth and total fertility rate (TFR, the 
average number of children women have in their lifetime) has been used to claim that 
economic development drives the demographic transition, and thus “development is the best 
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contraceptive”. This adage was first attributed to India’s health minister Karan Singh at the 
UN’s third International Conference on Population and Development, in Bucharest in 1974. It 
has since been championed as a ‘convenient truth’ by development agencies and advocates 
who would rather not engage with the divisive issue of reproduction. The implication is that 
family planning programs are either unnecessary, ineffective or inappropriate. 
 
Whether family planning programs are unnecessary, ineffective or inappropriate remains 
unsubstantiated in evidence. It is common to hear statements from aid agencies or 
development advocates such as “the evidence in most countries suggest it is mostly the move 
out of poverty that brings the growth rate down, not the other way around” (Costello, 2013) 
or “the single most tested, reliable method is the empowerment and education of women” 
(George, 2010, p168). References are never given, nor has this author succeeded in finding 
any empirical study which reached these conclusions. 
 
This paper accepts the view, expressed in the Cairo Programme of Action, of “the crucial 
contribution that early stabilization of the world population would make towards the 
achievement of sustainable development” (UNFPA, 1995). It is argued that the soonest and 
lowest achievable peak in human population is most desirable, to minimise risks of food 
insecurity, dangerous climate change, energy constraints and critical loss of biodiversity and 
ecosystem functions. These hazards threaten to stabilise human population by increasing 
mortality. Thus it is not a greater population per se that should be avoided, but greater human 
suffering and mortality that results from population pressure. While technological and 
institutional improvements might be employed to accommodate more people from a limited 
resource base, the same improvements would be better employed to accommodate fewer 
people at a higher living standard. This places importance on the rate at which fertility is 
reduced in high fertility countries. Importantly, it also depends on the receptiveness of 
societies, rich and poor, to voluntary population stabilisation and its various repercussions 
such as an older demographic profile. Government pronatalism, as a misguided response to 
demographic ageing, is increasingly contributing to the extent to which global population 
growth has exceeded recent projections. 
 
This study seeks to shed light on the relative contributions of family planning programs, 
increasing income and education for girls, for the pace of fertility decline in different 
countries. It draws mainly on macro-level data, collected by global agencies. Most evaluation 
of policies and programs has addressed immediate proximal impacts on communities and 
households (Robinson and Ross, 2007; Sinding, 2009; May, 2012). These evaluations have 
provided a great deal of evidence of the benefits of family planning interventions and of 
female education and economic empowerment, extending across a wide range of health and 
socio-economic indicators. However, this information is mostly qualitative, identifying the 
effects and the means by which they are mediated. It is hoped that a more distal view will 
highlight which contributing factors prevail, and thus add to understanding of effective 
policy. 
 
Methods 
 
Data were taken from the UN Population Division (2011a), World Bank (2012) and 
Population Reference Bureau (2012). The time course of change in Total Fertility Rate 
(TFR), and of GDP per capita, GNI per capita and girls’ primary school enrolment and 
completion were plotted for each nation for which data were available. Case studies were 
taken from each region to compare nations with differing strength and timing of family 
planning programs.  
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Total fertility rate data were available for five-year intervals from 1950. World Bank 
economic statistics were available for most countries in most years from 1960. Data on 
school enrolment and other social statistics were more sparse, beginning around 1970 for 
many nations and later for others. The “Adjusted net enrolment rate, primary, female (% of 
primary school age children)” (WB indicator code SE.PRM.TENR.FE) and “Primary 
completion rate, female (% of relevant age group)” (WB indicator code 
SE.PRM.CMPT.FE.ZS) were selected as having relatively good coverage of most countries 
since 1970. While secondary schooling may have a stronger influence on reproductive 
behaviour, insufficient data were available for indicators of secondary schooling. However, 
increasing access to primary schooling over time is likely to be paralleled by access to 
secondary schooling, if at a lower level. The World Bank data were averaged over five year 
intervals corresponding to the periodicity of the TFR data. No adjustments were made for 
missing values. 
 
Results 
 
Countries which implemented strong population-focused voluntary family planning programs 
showed an abrupt decline in their TFR following the introduction of the programs (Figure 1). 
The differential timing of these transitions strongly suggests that political will of national 
governments is a dominant factor in determining the timing, pace and extent of fertility 
decline. Over the first two decades following program initiation, rates of fertility decline were 
between 2 and 3 units per decade. These rates contrast with the slow decline, and recent 
stalling of decline, in less developed and least developed countries in aggregate. 
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Figure 1. Time course of total fertility rate for selected countries which implemented population-
focused voluntary family planning programs at differing times, showing rapid response of fertility after 
the initiation of the program. 
 
Figure 2 contrasts a country with strong family planning programs from each of four global 
regions with another country in the same region which did not explicitly or consistently 
promote family planning and smaller family norms. The latter generally showed a later and 
more gradual decline in TFR (Figure 2, left-hand charts).  
 
In most countries, per capita GDP has risen fairly consistently over the half-century covered 
by the World Bank data. However, comparing family planning countries with non-family 
planning countries revealed a divergence, with family planning nations showing more rapid 
increase in wealth (Figure 2, middle charts). The timing of this divergence was always later 
than the fall in fertility, and hence cannot be considered a cause of the difference in fertility 
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rate. In fact, in most cases the acceleration of economic growth occurred after TFR had fallen 
to between two and three children per woman.  
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Figure 2.  Fertility and wealth time courses for five nations which adopted family planning (solid lines) 
in contrast with comparable countries in the same region (dotted lines) which were weak or non-
adopters of family planning. Left: the change in Total Fertility Rate (TFR, the average number of 
children born to each woman over her lifetime) over the period 1950 to 2008 (UN Population 
Estimates, 2010 Revision), middle: the average GDP per capita over 5-year intervals from 1960 to 
2008 (adjusted to constant year 2000 US$, ppp (purchase price parity), from World Bank World 
Development Indicators), and right: the relationship between TFR and GDP per capita. 
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The relationship between TFR and GDP per capita is depicted in the right-hand charts of 
Figure 2. The curves are concave in most cases, as fertility declined before substantial 
economic development was achieved, but economic development accelerated below TFR of 
3. If economic development were a major contributor to fertility decline, one would expect 
convex curves. Non-family planning countries typically followed a roughly parallel course, 
achieving little economic development while fertility remained high. Many of them are yet to 
reach the point at which per capita wealth accelerates.  
 
As noted in Figure 2, China’s fall in fertility largely predated the introduction of the one-child 
policy in 1979. China’s communist government was initially pronatalist but food insecurity 
prompted a voluntary family planning program beginning in 1970, promoting later marriage 
and no more than two children. During the period of strong implementation of the one-child 
policy in the 1980s, the rate of fertility decline in China was much slower than over the 
previous decade. At least some of this change of pace would have been due to deferral of 
childbearing in the early years of China’s voluntary family planning efforts, with deferred 
births eventually occurring in the 1980s. It is difficult to say whether the unpopular coercive 
measures actually increased desired family size, but the data do not provide any evidence that 
the coercive one-child program was either a necessary or a successful contributor to China’s 
population stabilisation. The fertility rate achieved by China is similar to that achieved by 
other East- and South-East Asian nations through voluntary programs. 
 
The relationships between girls’ education indicators and TFR generally showed a negative 
correlation in most countries. However, a range of patterns is evident (Figure 3). 
 
In Central America and South Asia, where efforts have been steady on both goals 
simultaneously, the curves are largely parallel although the pace at which individual nations 
have progressed along this common course varies.  
 
In South East Asia a wider range of patterns exists. The Philippines and Malaysia have had 
high female participation in schooling throughout the period of the data, but have shown only 
a slow decline from high fertility rates. In contrast, Thailand achieved considerable fertility 
reduction at low levels of girls’ schooling, including that which predated the schooling data 
presented. The same may be said of Indonesia (Sukamdi, 2011) although the World Bank 
data set does not include educational data from its earlier period of fertility decline. Laos and 
Cambodia have seen rapid increase in girls’ education accompanied by fertility decline 
initially, but recently as family planning has fallen in development priority their fertility 
decline has stalled despite continued progress on education. 
 
North Africa also provides contrasts between nations. Morocco reduced fertility with little 
improvement in girls’ education, while both improved in parallel in Tunisia and fertility 
followed education improvement in Algeria. Egypt, with inconsistent government support for 
family planning, has shown slow decline in TFR despite attaining high rates of school 
completion by girls. Libya’s rapid improvement in girls’ educational attainment in the 1970s 
was not followed by fertility decline until the late 1980s (during which period no data on 
educational attainment are recorded).  
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A: Central America 
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B: South Asia 
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C: South-East Asia 
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D: North Africa  
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E: West Africa 
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Figure 3. Relationship between total fertility rate and girls’ education attainment (primary school 
completion) for selected nations from global regions. Female primary completion rate are World Bank 
indicator SE.PRM.CMPT.FE.ZS, data are average of those available for five-year periods between 
1970 to 2010, and 2012. Total fertility rate 1970 to 2010 are from UN Population Division (2011) and 
for 2012 from Population Reference Bureau (2012). 
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Sub-Saharan Africa’s data “cloud” (not shown) is almost horizontal, with considerable 
progress in girls’ education in most nations accompanied by little decline in fertility. Figure 3 
E shows selected countries, demonstrating the impact of different policy settings. The early 
success of family planning programs in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire were achieved without high 
access to education, but have not been sustained. Neither Nigeria’s relatively high access to 
education nor Mali’s rapidly improving access have translated into fertility decline. Cape 
Verde has achieved both high education of girls and low fertility, and is the only nation to 
have graduated out of Least Developed Country status in recent years (May, 2012, p 241). 
 
It may be concluded from these data that education of girls is not necessary for achieving 
fertility reduction, as some nations have achieved it while education access was low. It is also 
apparent that education access is not sufficient to cause fertility reduction, since some nations 
have maintained high fertility in spite of high participation of girls in education.  
 
Several countries in most regions have seen TFR level off or rebound, above replacement rate 
fertility, despite further improvements in educational attainment of girls. This appears to be 
due to a number of factors, including reduced international support for family planning, a 
change in emphasis of family planning toward achieving desired family size but not 
influencing it, and increased concern by national governments about demographic ageing 
(UNPD, 2011b).  
 
It should be noted that population stabilisation depends on a decline in absolute growth rate 
(annual increment of people), not only relative growth rate. Bangladesh added as many 
people in 2010, with a TFR of 2.3, as it did in 1970 with a TFR of 6.9. Although 
Bangladesh’s annual increment came down considerably from its peak in 1989, it has begun 
to increase again in recent years since fertility decline slowed. Indonesia and Algeria, both 
rebounding from near-replacement fertility and still experiencing strong demographic 
momentum, are adding more people per annum than in 1970 and are close to exceeding their 
highest ever increment. 
 
According to the Population Reference Bureau’s 2012 World Population Data Sheet, neither 
least developed countries nor less developed countries excluding China have seen a decline in 
fertility since the UN Population Division’s estimate for 2005-2010. The UN’s medium 
projection depends on a fertility decline of around one unit per decade in these countries. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The position that family planning is ineffective or inappropriate is held by people from a 
range of ideological perspectives, and thus its defences are inconsistent. Some do not believe 
that overpopulation is possible – that even if the planet is finite, man’s ingenious ability to 
derive sustenance from it is not (Simon, 1981). Others refuse to consider the possibility of 
limits to human population, in the belief that all such discussions are driven by misanthropic, 
racist people whose ideas should not be given oxygen. Perhaps faith in divine providence 
better describes their position than a conscious belief in infinite resources. Some do 
acknowledge the ultimate potential for overpopulation, but are assured that population growth 
will end naturally without intervention well before limits are reached. They generally refer to 
the UN’s medium projection as proof, without acknowledging the UN Population Division’s 
own insistence that the projection assumes a rapid fall in fertility and that “this middle 
scenario could require additional substantial efforts to make it possible” (Wilmoth, 2013; 
original emphasis).  
 
 8
Others are genuine in their conviction that efforts to reduce poverty will suffice. This position 
may be motivated by a belief that family planning is intrusive on the reproductive rights of 
individuals. Given the prevalence of coercive pregnancy and the well-documented unmet 
need for fertility control among married women in developing countries, a far stronger case 
can be made that the neglect of family planning is the greater threat to reproductive rights. 
This is indeed the position taken in the Cairo Programme of Action, and in the Millennium 
Development Goals, yet support for family planning has shrunk under the tenure of these 
agenda. 
 
The efficacy of voluntary family planning programs in reducing fertility has been widely 
reviewed and affirmed (Robinson and Ross, 2007). Many factors including socioeconomic 
status and education levels contribute to the pace of uptake, but these factors in the absence 
of family planning programs and political support for birth reduction are not sufficient to 
ensure uptake. The analysis presented in this paper reinforces this conclusion. 
 
Effects of population growth on economic development 
 
Family planning access is widely regarded as essential for women to achieve their 
reproductive rights and social autonomy, but these goals are not given high priority in 
development agenda. The overriding concern is for macro-economic development. Here a 
perception has evolved that population growth is beneficial, and that ‘stagnation’ or even 
‘depopulation’ are serious threats to prosperity. The number of national governments who 
consider their population growth to be too low has risen, despite many of them experiencing 
strong population growth (UNPD 2011b). Even demographers with intimate understanding of 
the threats of population growth in developing countries are swayed by the weight of opinion 
that ‘stagnation’ should be avoided (May, 2012), although the weight of evidence is lacking. 
This bodes ill for the prospect of early stabilisation of the global population. The inevitable 
result is upward revision of future population projections until resource limits erode life 
expectancy.  
 
This is a worrying development, since the benefit or otherwise of population growth in the 
short term does not diminish the risk of catastrophic impacts in the longer term. Already the 
escalation of conflict in many regions, and in Egypt in particular, is linked to population 
pressure (Lagi et al. 2011; Friedman, 2013; Ahmed, 2013).  
 
It is doubly worrying when there is overwhelming evidence that population growth hampers 
economic development, in advanced as well as developing countries. 
 
In understanding the economic impacts of population growth, it is necessary to separate those 
of population level in relation to the natural resource base, demographic age structure and 
population growth rate. Advocates for a positive or neutral impact of population growth 
generally omit analysis of the costs of growth rate. Those who have considered growth rate 
impacts find them to be strongly negative. 
 
Coale and Hoover (1958) identified the effect of growth rate on saving and investment rate 
(supply of capital). In contrast, Sauvy (1961) emphasised the impact on demand for capital, 
specifically the need to divert available capital to the task of providing for additional people, 
just to stand still in terms of standards of living and employment availability, diminishing the 
investment available for per capita improvement. He termed this capacity expansion burden 
“demographic investment”. Robinson (1974) developed this analysis of the opportunity cost 
of capacity expansion, illustrating the case of Bangladesh. He estimated that “the cost of 
standing still with present population growth [3% p.a.] represents just about 75 per cent of all 
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the investment”. While planned levels of investment might increase per capita income by 30 
per cent over the following 20 years, if a European level of population growth applied (0.45% 
p.a. at that time) incomes would be increased by a factor of 2.5 (150%). 
 
The ability of a society to maintain such levels of investment might best be assessed by 
expressing it as a proportion of national income. Estimates given in the literature for each one 
per cent population growth include 4 per cent for maintenance of housing and public 
infrastructure plus 3 to 4 per cent for the creation of employment (Sinha and Zacharia, 1984 p 
217; Robinson, 1974). Thurow (1986) estimated 12.5% of GDP per one per cent population 
growth. This range concurs with estimates of actual expenditure per one per cent population 
growth of approximately 7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) in the United Kingdom 
(O’Sullivan, 2013) and 10 per cent of GNI in Australia (O’Sullivan 2012). This burden is 
additional to the burden of high youth dependency ratios in high fertility countries. Hence the 
economic stimulus from alleviating it (which we will term the “infrastructure dividend”) is 
additional to, and likely to be greater than, that from the “demographic dividend” of reducing 
age dependency. Even in countries facing reversal of the demographic dividend due to 
ageing, the cost of “demographic investment” far exceeds the extent to which population 
growth may diminish the costs associated with demographic ageing (O’Sullivan, 2012). 
 
The analysis presented in this paper supports the claim that population growth constrains 
economic development. Although the economic circumstances of individual nations differs 
greatly, the double benefit of infrastructure dividend and demographic dividend is evident in 
the acceleration of per capita wealth experienced by so many nations as TFR approaches two. 
 
Thurow’s (1986) essay argued that the focus on carrying capacity and the potential for 
overpopulation is unnecessary, if the cost of growth rate itself is sufficient reason to end 
population growth. Two and a half decades later, with an additional two billion people, 
planetary limits are becoming a real and present danger. Yet it appears that nations have 
never been less interested in population stabilisation. 
 
The relationship between girls’ education and fertility decline 
 
Education for girls is widely cited as effective in reducing fertility rate. Within any society, 
those women who completed schooling tend to start families later and have fewer children 
than those who had limited schooling. However, the extent to which greater education causes 
the choice of lower fertility is less well established. Higher than average access to education 
implies higher than average economic situation and a relatively enlightened attitude of the 
parents towards education and career prospects for their daughters, and these factors 
themselves may influence marriage age and desired family size.  
 
Wheeler and Hammer (2010) estimated that a dollar spent on family planning would avoid 
more births than a dollar spent on girls’ education, in 70% of the countries studied. However, 
they emphasised the synergy between the two interventions, with secondary enrolment rates 
in particular anticipated to reduce the unit cost of family planning (expenditure per avoided 
birth). Hence they modelled the optimal allocation of funds allocating greater funding of 
education, where existing education access is low. 
 
Potts and Marsh (2010) concluded “education reduces family size because more educated 
women are better able to surmount the many barriers separating them from the information 
and technologies they need to manage their childbearing. When these barriers are removed, 
then differences in fertility between illiterate and educated women largely disappear.”  
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The data presented in this paper relate TFR to educational attainment actually achieved, 
rather than the funding of programs to achieve it. Here it is clear that causation flows in both 
directions. Anecdotal evidence associates family planning programs with greater retention of 
girls in secondary school. This is particularly true for those programs aimed at reducing child 
marriage and early pregnancy and those aimed at adolescent reproductive health education. 
Less directly, smaller families result in more educational investment in each child and less 
pressure for girls to remain at home to care for younger siblings (UN News and Media 
Division, 2011). Lower population growth rates greatly alleviate the challenge of providing 
sufficient schools and teachers for quality education (Campbell et al., 2007). In most 
developing countries, the ratio of girls to boys in secondary school is higher than the 
percentage of girls enrolled in school (World Bank, 2013), suggesting that girls’ attendance is 
limited more by lack of school capacity or proximity than by social attitudes. A smaller youth 
bulge increases the prospects of school graduates finding employment, an important incentive 
for students and their families. 
 
However, even among educated women, cultural conditioning and pressure to achieve large 
families may persist. Changing such cultural norms may require a combination of 
interventions, from public education of both men and women, to addressing the legal and 
institutional barriers to women achieving economic autonomy through employment, land 
tenure or access to financial services. Such measures are commendable in their own right, but 
also have a legitimate role in population policy. The success of family planning programs in 
reducing desired family size in many countries provides evidence that, while cultural context 
may be a complex issue, it is not intractable. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It was observed that countries that implemented strong family planning programs achieved 
fertility reduction much faster and earlier than comparable countries that did not. Fertility 
decline typically preceded marked increases in wealth, but per capita wealth growth 
accelerated when fertility fell to between two and three births per woman. Consequently the 
negative relationship between TFR and GDP per capita tends to be concave for those 
countries that have achieved relatively low fertility. This indicates that population growth is 
an economic burden, and its alleviation stimulates development. Higher fertility countries in 
the same region tend to follow a parallel course, but at a slower pace, and many with current 
fertility above three are yet to see sustained wealth increase.  
 
In the absence of significant income from oil or other resources, sustained growth in per 
capita wealth appears to be dependent on fertility reduction to a substantial extent. Education 
of girls may enhance fertility reduction, but is not a substitute for family planning programs. 
Causation evidently runs in both directions, with a virtuous cycle of reduced birth rate and 
population growth enhancing prosperity and access to education and health services, in turn 
enhancing the reduction in family size. However, interventions to promote prosperity or for 
education of women are less cost-effective in priming this cycle than interventions for 
fertility reduction.  
 
These observations are consistent with the many accounts of reduced fertility contributing to 
economic betterment of families and communities (Sinding, 2009). It is widely argued that 
fertility control is vital to allow women to complete schooling and to sustain employment 
outside the home. The demographic dividend of reducing age dependency is also widely 
recognised. Less recognised is the greater dividend of alleviating the need to expand 
infrastructure capacity (O’Sullivan, 2012). Unlike the demographic dividend, the 
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infrastructure dividend does not reverse as populations age. It far outweighs costs associated 
with demographic ageing.  
 
Despite these well-substantiated arguments, it has become unfashionable to identify family 
size or population growth rate as impediments to economic development. Family planning 
programs are no longer central to national development plans, but have been framed as 
merely one among many competing health agenda. 
 
It is concluded that fertility reduction through programs specifically aimed at reducing 
unwanted pregnancies and promoting smaller families have been powerful drivers of the rate 
of demographic transition and economic development. “Development as the best 
contraceptive” is not substantiated. This belief may indeed hinder economic development and 
limit its extent by ensuring a higher peak population than may have otherwise been realised. 
A far stronger case can be made that “Contraception as the best economic stimulus.” 
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